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Abstract
The earning structure in science is known to be ￿at relative to the one in the
private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this
paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of
the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and
the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the
institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition of
priority). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent
in science than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the
brain drain. We also ￿nd that the availability of extra monetary incentives through
the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby
worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary
and non-monetary incentives in science and show the optimality of the ￿at earning
structure in science.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Inducing talented people to become scientists is a national priority for all countries
since a nation￿s economic future is closely linked to its scienti￿c capacity in today￿s
knowledge-based economy. However, the private incentive for a talented agent to choose
as c i e n t i ￿c career may not be well aligned with the social incentive because she has
many other attractive alternatives. For instance, in the U.S., bright young people with
college degrees can pursue graduate study in one of the major professional ￿elds such as
medicine, law and business. Compared to advanced study in science, these ￿elds promise
a much shorter period in school and substantially more lucrative job prospects.1 This
might generate a brain drain from the science sector to the private sector. Currently,
both in the U.S. and in Europe, there are concerns about a shortage of scientists and
engineers2.
This paper studies the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private
sector in an economy in which each agent makes an occupational choice between becom-
ing a scientist and becoming a professional. We make a departure from the conventional
assumption that only monetary payoﬀs matter and assume that each agent values fame
as well. We use a rather narrow de￿nition of fame as the amount of recognition that an
agent receives from her peers as a function of her performance and study the allocation
of talent by focusing on the diﬀerence between the two sectors in terms of the mapping
from talent to performance.
A fundamental diﬀerence between the two sectors is that agents in the private sector
can more or less appropriate their contribution to the society through pro￿ts while
scientists (in pure science) cannot because of the public good nature of science. This
diﬀerence in turn generates another important diﬀerence in terms of allocation of fame;
the market provides an objective measure of each agent￿s performance (i.e. her pro￿t)
1Butz et als. (2003) compare an estimate of annualized earnings for Ph.D.s with earnings of profes-
sional degree holders in U.S. such as MDs, DDSs, DVMs, JDs, and MBAs and ￿nd that professional
degree holders earn more at nearly every age and considerably more over an entire life career.
2For instance, New York Times (May 5, 2004) says ￿The Unites States faces a major shortage of
scientists because too few Americans are entering technical ￿elds and because international competition
is heating up for bright foreigners who once ￿lled the gap￿ referring to the report of National Science
Board (2004). Concerning Europe, see the recent report of the European Commission (2003).
1and accordingly distributes fame while, the science sector, in order to have an objective
measure of each scientist￿s performance, needs an institution which certi￿es the scienti￿c
contribution of each work. According to the sociologists of science such as Merton
(1957, 1973), science is a social institution which de￿nes originality as a supreme value
and allocates fame and recognition according to priority so that the augmenting of
knowledge and the augmenting of personal fame go hand in hand.3 This incentive role
of peer recognition for scientists is also recognized by Paul Samuelson who said
￿In the long run, the economic scholar works for the only coin worth having - our
own applause￿ (Merton, 1968, p. 341).
We build a simple model in which each agent has private information about her
level of talent and her intrinsic preference between the two occupations (scientist and
professional) and the government builds a public science sector. An agent can be either
talented or not while her occupational preference has a support wide enough that there
is a positive fraction of both talented and not-talented agents in each sector in equilib-
rium. We focus on the refereeing and publication process of the institution of science
and de￿ne the quality of the institution as the quality of the mapping from intrinsic out-
comes of scienti￿c work to perceived outcomes. The perceived outcome of each scientist
is observed by the government and her peers: the former provides monetary rewards
and the latter provides non-monetary rewards (i.e. peer recognition) depending on the
perceived outcome. In contrast, in the case of professionals, we do not make any distinc-
tion between intrinsic and perceived outcomes since we assume that each professional￿s
pro￿ti so b s e r v a b l e .
We investigate three related issues in this setting. First, we study the brain drain
generated by lower monetary returns to talent in science and how it is aﬀected by peer
recognition and the quality of the institution of science. Second, we study how the
availability of additional monetary incentives through the market (for instance, from
licensing patents) aﬀects the brain drain. Last, we consider a more general framework in
which the government uses two instruments, salaries and research grants, without any
constraint in order to investigate whether a relatively ￿at earning structure in science
can arise as an optimal feature compatible with the absence of brain drain.
3According to Merton (1957), the institution of science has developed a priority-based system for
allocating (honori￿c) rewards. Heading the list of recognition is eponymy, the practice of aﬃxing the
names of the scientist to all or part of what she has found, as with the Copernican system, Hooke￿s law
etc. Other rewards include prizes, medals, memberships in honorary academies. Last, publication and
citation constitute rewards available to most scientists.
2In the absence of fame, a brain drain toward the private sector arises in our basic
model because we assume that the monetary reward to talent is higher in the private
sector than in the science sector. This assumption is true in (Continental) Europe
in which most institutions of higher education follow a system based on seniority and
performance has virtually no impact on salary.4 It also holds in U.S. since the pro￿le
of earnings in science is known to be rather ￿at5 while the returns to talent in the
private sector are large.6 We could ￿nd only weak evidence of the brain drain that
the number of US citizens with very high GRE-score (>750) headed for science and
engineering graduate studies declined by more than 8 % between 1992 and 2000 (Zumeta
and Ravelingals, 2002)7. However, predictions of a shortage of scientists both in Europe
and U.S. on the one hand and increasing rewards to talent in the private sector8 on the
other hand well justify our concerns about the brain drain.
Central in our model is the assumption that the intrinsic outcome of a scientist is
a less noisy signal of talent than that of a profession in the private sector. This makes
peer recognition have a potential role in attracting talent to science. We have three
main justi￿cations for this assumption. First, research is individual work while business
is team work: the average number of authors per research paper is four (Adams et als.
2004) while production and marketing processes of a ￿rm involve a much larger number
of people. Second, originality has a supreme value in science while, in other professions
without much team work such as lawyers and medical doctors, tasks are often routine
and repetitive: a path-breaking discovery is a clear sign of genius while one does not need
to be a genius in order to perform routine tasks well. Last, openness (i.e. making one￿s
discovery public) is the norm in science because of priority recognition while secrecy
4See for instance Aghion and Cohen (2004) and the Wall Street Journal Europe (September 3, 2004).
5The average full professor earns only about 38 to 109 percent more than the average new assistant
professor depending on the discipline (Ehrenberg, 1992). Even the best-paid professor in the ￿fty leading
universities seldom receives three times as much salary as the worst-paid professor (Stigler, 1988).
6Although Butz et als. (2003) show that professionals make more money than Ph.D.s, there is
no empirical work comparing the monetary rewards to talent in both sectors. However, top money
managers, for instance, can earn more than $250 million a year (NY Times, ￿Doesn￿t Anyone Want to
Manage Harvard￿s Money?￿, August 5, 2005) and it is needless to say that no professor￿s salary can be
that high.
7They also ￿nd that among US citizens and long-term residents, the share of the science and engi-
neering majors from leading colleges or universities planning immediate advanced study in a science or
engineering discipline fell from 17% in 1984 to 12% in 1998.
8See the literature on superstars (Rosen, 1981), complementarity and positive sorting (Kremer,
1993), skill-biased technological changes (Caselli, 1999) and the ￿nance literature on CEO compensation
(Murphy, 1999).
3is the norm in the private sector because of pro￿ts e e k i n g ,w h i c hm a k e s￿ltering out
of noise in performance more diﬃcult in the private sector. As a consequence of the
assumption, the expected non-pecuniary reward to talent in terms of peer recognition is
higher in science than in the private sector when the institution of science is perfect.
As a benchmark, we study the ￿rst-best allocation of talent when the government
can observe the level of talent and make the wage of each scientist depend on her level
of talent. It is widely believed that real innovation in science depends less on the many
￿worker bees￿ than on the presence of a small number of great minds. This, together
w i t ht h eh u g ep o s i t i v ee x t e r n a l i t yo fag r e a ts c i e n t i ￿c discovery on society, would make
talent more productive in science than in the private sector. Then, in the ￿rst-best
outcome, the fraction of scientists is higher among talented agents than among not-
talented agents.
Under incomplete information about talent, the government can make the wage of
a scientist depend only on her perceived outcome. We assume an upper bound on the
wage diﬀerential within the science sector that makes the monetary reward to talent
lower in science than in the private sector. In the absence of utility from fame, this leads
to a brain drain toward the private sector. However, when agents derive utility from
fame, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain (and may even achieve
the ￿rst-best allocation) by providing a non-monetary reward to talent higher than in
the private sector while a bad institution of science exacerbates it. We also ￿nd that
progressive pro￿t taxes help to mitigate the brain drain.9
In Section 4, we study how making extra monetary incentives through the market
available to scientists aﬀects the brain drain. For instance, measures such as Bayh-Dole
Act (1980) in the U.S. enable universities to claim ownership of the intellectual property
rights generated from federally funded research and provide scientists with opportunities
to earn money and most OECD countries emulated the American experience. However,
Florida (1999) argues that high involvement of universities in commercialization can
restrict universities￿ ability to attract and produce top talent. In our analysis, we depart
from a simple linear relationship between basic and applied science and introduce what
we call the Pasteur￿s Quadrant (PQ)10 coeﬃcient to capture the degree to which basic
9The question of how progressiveness of tax rates aﬀects the allocation of talent has not been studied
in the optimal taxation literature (Mirrlees 1971, Saez 2002, etc). Furthermore, most papers in the
literature ￿nd the negative eﬀect of progressive taxes in terms of incentive to work.
10Pasteur￿s Quadrant is the title of the book written by Stokes (1997) who mainly argues against the
standard distinction between basic and applied science as two distinct categories by pointing out that
Patseur made pioneering discovery although he was motivated to ￿nd solutions to practical problems.
4research can generate patentable scienti￿ck n o w l e d g e .W e￿nd that licensing opportunity
reduces the brain drain when the PQ coeﬃcient is high while it can worsen it when the
coeﬃcient is low. We also identify a trade-oﬀ between the direct eﬀect on the reward to
talent from extra income generated by licensing and the indirect eﬀect from the change
in the mapping from talent to intrinsic outcome which occurs when licensing opportunity
causes a shift from basic to applied research.
In Section 5, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary
incentives in science in a general setting in which the government uses two instruments,
salaries and research grants. We assume away any restriction on the instrument and show
that a relatively ￿at earning structure in science is optimal when the institution of science
is good and scientists highly value priority recognition and that this is compatible with
no brain drain. In our setting, the government observes an individual signal correlated
with each scientist￿s talent and awards research grants as a function of the signals.
The characterization of the optimal research grants is done in terms of what we call
the bene￿t-adjusted social marginal cost of providing grants, which decreases with the
quality of the institution of science. This implies that as the quality of the institution
increases, one should increase the relative weight of the non-monetary incentive over the
monetary one.
Although there are papers on economics of science which refer to the sociology of
science (Dasgupta and Paul, 1987, 1994 and Stephan 1996), they have not built any
formal model to address the allocation of talent between the private sector and the
science sector. Furthermore, the existing literature on the brain drain under asymmetric
information initiated by Kwok and Leland (1982) studies only the migration from one
country to another but does not study the brain drain from the science sector to the
private one in a closed economy.
In terms of modeling incentives from non-monetary rewards, our paper is related
to Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2005). The former builds a
signaling model in which reputation from social groups provides incentives to engage in
pro-social behavior such as blood donation. The latter studies the incentive issues in
mission-oriented organizations such as schools and ￿nd a potential bene￿to ft h em a r k e t
in inducing a good match among the principals and the agents with diﬀerent mission
preferences. Both papers focus on how non-monetary rewards can help to solve moral
hazard while we focus on how non-monetary rewards can help to screen agents with
Rosenberg (2004) also argues in a similar spirit that causation between science and technology runs
both ways.
5diﬀerent levels of talent.
With respect to the principal-agent theory, our paper is related to the literature on
non-responsiveness (Guesnerie and Laﬀont, 1984), which focuses on a strong con￿ict
between the allocation preferred by the principal and the allocations implementable
under incentive constraints. In our paper, the con￿ict arises since the principal (the
government) wants the fraction of scientists among talented agents to be larger than
the one among not-talented agents while the incentive constraints may constrain the
principal to implement only those allocations in which the latter is larger than the
former. Our problem is symmetric to the one analyzed by Jeon and Laﬀont (1998) who
study the optimal mechanism for downsizing the public sector when workers have private
information on their productivity although they consider neither science nor fame.
Regarding papers on the allocation of talent (Acemoglu and Verdier 1998, 2000,
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991, Grossman and Maggi 2000, and Grossman 2004),
none of them model fame or study allocation of talent between the science sector and
the private sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the model and focuses on the brain drain. Section 4 analyzes how the availabil-
ity of extra monetary incentives through the market aﬀects the brain drain. Section 5
analyzes the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.
Section 6 discusses our results and Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are in Appendix.
2 The basic model
2.1 Adverse selection and outcomes
There is a mass one of risk-neutral agents in the economy. Let I be the set of all the
agents. Each agent should make an occupational choice between becoming a professional
in the private sector and becoming a scientist. Although a lot of scienti￿c research is
carried out by the private sector in reality, in our model, ￿becoming a professional￿ is
equivalent to ￿going to the private sector￿. Agent i has private information about her
level of talent (or intelligence), denoted by θi, and her intrinsic preference between the
two professions, denoted by γi. For simplicity, θi can take two values: θi ∈ Θ ≡ {T,N};
θi = T is called a talented type and θi = N is called a not￿talented type. θi is identically
and independently distributed. Since we focus on the choice between professional and
6scientist, we do not lose much generality by considering a uni-dimensional talent space.11
Let ν ∈ (0,1) denote the probability that θi = T; hence 1 − ν =P r {θi = N}.L e t
IT ≡ {i ∈ I | θi = T} and IN ≡ {i ∈ I | θi = N}. W h e nw ed on o tr e f e rt oas p e c i ￿c
agent, we drop the subscript i; for instance, we use θ instead of θi.
γi represents the diﬀerence between the intrinsic (non-monetary) pleasure that agent
i derives from being professional and the intrinsic pleasure from being scientist such
that γi < 0 means that agent i has a relative preference for scientist over professional.
For instance, the intrinsic pleasure from becoming scientist can include love of science
or satisfaction from solving puzzles (Levin and Stephan, 1991). Since what matters for
social welfare is each agent￿s choice between the two professions and intrinsic pleasure
aﬀects agent i￿s choice only through the relative pleasure γi, we normalize, without
loss of generality, each agent￿s absolute pleasure from becoming scientist at zero. For
simplicity, we assume that γi is identically and independently distributed over i according
to a uniform distribution with support [−γ,γ] and that there is no correlation between
θi and γi. We discuss the case of correlation in section 6.
Let Oi ∈ {R,S} represent agent i￿s occupational choice: Oi = R (Oi = S)w h e n
she becomes professional (scientist). We assume for simplicity that the outcome that an
agent realizes after choosing an occupation has a binary support: it can be high or low.
More precisely, a type θ scientist realizes a high outcome (i.e. a path-breaking discovery)
with probability pS
θ and a low outcome (i.e. an ordinary discovery) with probability
1−pS
θ. We focus on pure scienti￿c research which does not produce any direct monetary
gain to the scientist but increases the productive potential of the future economy. We
assume that the social monetary value of a path-breaking discovery is sH > 0 and that
of an ordinary discovery is sL ∈ (0,s H).A t y p e θ professional produces a high pro￿t
(before tax) πH > 0 with probability pR
θ and a low pro￿t πL ∈ (0,πH) with probability
1 − pR
θ . Obviously ∆pO ≡ pO
T − pO
N > 0 for O ∈ {R,S}.L e tΠθ ≡ pR
θ πH +( 1− pR
θ )πL
and Sθ ≡ pS
θsH +( 1− pS
θ)sL. The pro￿t realized by an professional is veri￿able such
that her tax payment depends on it.
2.2 Institution of science and fame
There are many factors aﬀecting the quality of the institution of science. In this paper,
we take a narrow angle and focus on refereeing and publication process. We de￿ne the
11By contrast, if we study a choice between entrepreneur and researcher, we need to consider a
multi-dimensional type space since to be a good entrepreneur, one needs mutiple skills (Lazear, 2002).
7quality of the institution of science as the quality of the mapping from the intrinsic
outcomes of scientists to the perceived outcomes. The intrinsic outcome refers to the
original value of a scienti￿cw o r ka n dt h ep e r c e i v e do u t c o m er e f e r st ot h ec e r t i ￿cation
label that the work receives through refereeing and publication process. The intrinsic
outcome can be high or low as was de￿ned in section 2.1. We assume that the perceived





denote the probability that a high
intrinsic outcome is perceived as high, which is assumed to be equal to the probability
that a low intrinsic outcome is perceived as low for simplicity. Therefore, qr
12 is a
measure of the quality of the institution of science.
In our de￿nition of fame, we focus on peer recognition and de￿ne an individual￿s
fame as the total recognition she gets from her peers. The amount of recognition that
agent i receives is assumed to increase with the level of her outcome perceived by the
peers and with the number of the peers. In order to focus on the information structure
mapping talent to perceived outcome in each sector, we assume that the measure of the
peers is the same in each profession.13 Let η denote the measure of peers. For simplicity,
we assume that if agent i￿s perceived outcome is low, she gets zero recognition while if
it is high, she gets a unit of recognition from each peer such that the total amount of
peer recognition is η.14 Therefore, the expected fame of a type θ professional is pR
θ η and
that of a type θ scientist is
£
pS




We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The intrinsic outcome is a less noisy signal of talent in science than
in the private sector (i.e. ∆pS > ∆pR).
We gave in the introduction three reasons for why assumption 1 is likely to hold.
This assumption implies that when the quality of the institution of science is perfect
(i.e. qr =1 ), the diﬀerence between a talented agent￿s expected fame and that of a not-
talented agent is larger in the science sector than in the private sector; in other words,
the non-pecuniary reward to talent in terms of fame is higher in the former than in the
latter.
Agent i￿s payoﬀ Ui is given as follows:
Ui = mi + αfi + γi1[Oi=R]
12qr means quality of refereeing.
13Our results are not aﬀected even though we assume that the measure of peers depends on the
profession as long as we do not endogenize it, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
14The quality of the institution of science can aﬀect the amount of recognition that one obtains from
a high perceived outcome. Including this aspect into our model does not aﬀect our results qualitatively.
8where mi is her monetary income, α(≥ 0) is the weight parameter for fame and fi is her
fame.
2.3 Government
In our model, the main role of the government consists in building a (public) science
sector to produce knowledge. The government can pay wages to induce agents to become
scientists and can make a scientist￿s wage contingent on her perceived outcome. Let w
be the basic salary that every scientist receives. Let b ≥ 0 be the bonus that a scientist
receives if her perceived outcome is high. This bonus can be interpreted as the increase
in salary following a promotion.15 We assume that there is an upper bound on b, denoted
by b>0.
The government levies taxes on the pro￿ts of professionals.16 Let tH (tL)d e n o t e
the tax when the pro￿t is high (low) and let t ≡ (tH,t L).D e ￿ne Tθ ≡ pR
θ tH +( 1−
pR
θ )tL: it represents the expected tax payment of a type θ professional. τ ≡ tH−tL
eH−eL is
a parameter representing the progressiveness of taxes; we assume 1 > τ > 0.G i v e n
that the pro￿t taxes are levied on many other occupations and we focus on the choice
between professional and scientist, we consider t ≡ (tH,t L) given. We make the following
assumption:
Assumption 2: The monetary reward to talent is higher in the private sector than






The inequality says that the diﬀerence between a talented professional￿s expected
net pro￿t and that of a not-talented one is higher than the diﬀerence between a talented
scientist￿s expected monetary income and that of a not-talented one even when qr =1 .
This implies that the monetary reward to talent is larger in the private sector than in





. This assumption captures the stylized
fact that monetary incentives are lower-powered in academia than in the private sector.
We provided the detailed justi￿cations of the assumption in the introduction.
15This description is far from the reality at least in some European countries such as Italy. According
to Perotti (2002)￿s study of the promotion to full professorship in economics in Italy, (i) an outsider
needs 13 more refereed publications than an insider in order to compensate for the advantage the latter
has; (ii) even in the competition among outsiders, the eﬀect of a publication in a high-quality journal
is not statistically diﬀerent from the eﬀect of a publication in a low-quality journal.
16We assume that (b,w) are monetary payments from the government net of taxes.
9In the absence of fame, the expected payoﬀ that a type θ agent with intrinsic occupa-
tional preference γi expects to obtain upon becoming professional is given by Πθ−Tθ+γi.
The agent chooses to become scientist if the following inequality holds:
w + p
S
θb ≥ Πθ − Tθ + γi.
An allocation of talent between the two occupations is characterized by φ ≡ (φT,φN) ∈
[0,1]
2 where φT (φN) denotes the fraction of the talented (not-talented) agents becoming
scientists. In the absence of fame (α =0 ), social welfare, denoted by SW,i sg i v e na s
follows:




where IR ≡ {i | Oi = R} is the set of professionals. We assume that the government
maximizes the above objective regardless of whether α > 0 or α =0 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,w e
assume that the government does not care about recognition per se but cares about it
since it aﬀects monetary social welfare through the allocation of talent. In reality, it is
hard to measure the aggregate level of fame or recognition in an economy and to make
the government accountable for it.17
In Section 5 where we study the optimal monetary and non-monetary rewards to
scientists in terms of salary and research grant, we introduce a positive shadow cost of
public funds λ(> 0), meaning that each dollar spent by the government is raised through
distortionary taxes (labor, capital and commodity taxes) and costs society 1+λ dollars
(Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). In all other sections, we assume λ =0for simplicity: our
results hold for λ > 0 as well but considering λ > 0 makes the exposition lengthy without
adding any new insight.
2.4 Timing
We consider a game with the following timing:
1. For each i ∈ I,n a t u r ed r a w sθi and γi and they become agent i￿s private infor-
mation.
2. The government announces {w,b}.
3. Each agent makes her occupational choice.
4. Each agent￿s outcome is realized.
5. Each professional pays tax and each scientist receives wage (and bonus).
17Furthermore, what people care about is often relative recognition rather than absolute recognition
and when we aggregate relative recognition, its sum is zero by de￿nition.
103 Allocation of talent and brain drain
3.1 Benchmarks without fame
We ￿rst study two benchmarks for an economy without fame (α =0 ). In the ￿rst bench-
m a r k ,w ed e r i v et h e￿rst-best allocation of talent when the government has complete
information about each agent￿s talent. In the second benchmark, we study the second-
best allocation in a more realistic setting in which each agent has private information
about her talent and there is an upper bound on b.
3.1.1 First-best: complete information on talent
Suppose that the government has complete information on θi, although γi is agent
i￿s private information. Suppose also that it is possible to make a scientist￿s wage
depend on her talent. Let wN and wT denote wages for talented and not-talented
scientists, respectively. Given wT,a g e n ti with θi = T becomes scientist if and only if
ΠT−TT+γi <w T.H e n c e ,i fwT−(ΠT−TT) ∈ [−γ,γ], the agent with γi = wT−(ΠT−TT)
becomes the cut-oﬀ type among talented agents in that all talented agents with γi lower
than wT−(ΠT−TT) become scientists and the fraction of scientists among talented agents
is φT =
wT−(ΠT−TT)+γ
2γ . Similarly, given wN,t h ec u t - o ﬀ type for not-talented agents is
given by γi = wN −(ΠN − TN) and the fraction of scientists among not-talented agents
is φN =
wN−(ΠN−TN)+γ
2γ .W r i t i n gwT (wN) as a function of φT (φN) shows that a given
interior allocation of talent (φT,φN) ∈ (0,1)
2 c a nb ea c h i e v e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n ti fw a g e s
are chosen as follows:
ΠT − TT +2 γφT − γ = wT (1)
ΠN − TN +2 γφN − γ = wN. (2)
Given an allocation of talent (φT,φN),t h ec u t - o ﬀ types are determined by γi =
γ(2φθ −1) for θ ∈ {T,N} and we can compute the sum of the agents￿ intrinsic pleasure













dz = γ [νφT (1 − φT)+( 1− ν)φN (1 − φN)].
Hence, social welfare is given as follows:
SW (φT,φN) ≡ ν(1 − φT)ΠT +( 1− ν)(1 − φN)ΠN + νφTST +( 1− ν)φNSN
+γ [νφT (1 − φT)+( 1− ν)φN (1 − φN)].
(3)
11The government maximizes SW with respect to (φT,φN) in [0,1]2.T h e ￿rst order
conditions (for an interior allocation) are given as follows:18
ΠT + γ(2φT − 1) = ST (4)
ΠN + γ(2φN − 1) = SN (5)
From the ￿rst order conditions, we ￿nd that for each θ ∈ {T,N}, the social marginal
value that the cut-oﬀ type produces as a professional is equal to the one she produces as
a scientist where the social marginal values take into account the intrinsic preferences for




N),t h e￿rst-best allocation of talent.
Notice that the same allocation would arise if the government could observe (θi,γi) for
every iand dictate each agent￿s occupational choice.
Proposition 1 (The ￿rst-best allocation of talent) Suppose that the government has
complete information on θi such that it can make each agent￿s wage depend on her level
of talent.









γ − ΠN + SN
2γ
. (6)





N), the fraction of scientists is larger among talented agents than among
not-talented agents if and only if talent is more productive in the science sector than in




N if and only if ST − SN > ΠT − ΠN.





Assumption 3: Talent is more productive in the science sector than in the private
sector: ST − SN > ΠT − ΠN.
We have ST − SN = ∆pS(sH − sL). It is widely believed that real innovation in
science depends less on the many ￿worker bees￿ than on the presence of a small number
of great minds (i.e. ∆pS high). This fact, together with the huge positive externality
of a great scienti￿c discovery on society (i.e. sH − sL high) makes assumption 3 quite
plausible.
18Throughout the paper we assume that the optimal allocations are interior; in the proofs in the
appendix we describe the conditions under which this is the case. Allowing for corner allocations is
straightforward but complicates the exposition without yielding any additional insight.
12Note that the ￿rst-best allocation of talent is given by (6) even when agents derive
some utility from fame since social welfare depends only on the allocation of talent and
not on fame regardless of the value of α.
3.1.2 Incomplete information outcome without fame
In this subsection we study the government￿s optimal choice of (w,b) under the assump-
tion that agent i has private information on θi and γi, but we still keep α =0 .W e
focus on how the incomplete information together with assumption 2 restricts the set of
implementable allocations of talent. In order to achieve an interior allocation of talent
(φT,φN) ∈ (0,1)
2, it is necessary that (w,b) satisfy the following incentive constraints:
(ICT) ΠT − TT +2 γφT − γ = βTb + w; (7)
(ICN) ΠN − TN +2 γφN − γ = βNb + w : (8)
where βθ ≡ pS
θqr +( 1− pS
θ)(1 − qr) represents the probability that a type-θ scientist
will have a high perceived outcome. If (ICθ) holds, all type-θ agents with intrinsic
occupational preference higher (lower) than 2γφθ − γ become professionals (scientists)
since the type with preference 2γφθ−γ is indiﬀerent between the two occupations. Then,
the fraction of type-θ agents becoming scientists is just φθ.
As long as qr ∈ (1
2,1], it is possible to solve (7)-(8) with respect to (w,b) because
qr > 1








where Aθ is the left hand side in (ICθ). Therefore, for any given allocation (φT,φN),
when qr > 1
2 we can ￿nd a pair (w,b) which implements (φT,φN) if we neglect the





After performing a simple manipulation and using βT −βN = ∆pS(2qr −1),w e￿nd
that b in (9) satis￿es b ≤ b if and only if
φN − φT ≥
(ΠT − TT) − (ΠN − TN) − ∆pS(2qr − 1)b
2γ
. (10)
Recall that ∆pS(2qr−1)b is the maximal monetary reward to talent in the science sector
given qr.A sqr (or b) increases, the maximal monetary reward to talent in the science
sector becomes larger and it is possible to induce a larger fraction of talented agents to





13be implemented for any qr ∈ [1
2,1]; since the monetary reward to talent in the private















N), by solving the following program19
max
(φT,φN)∈[0,1]
2 SW subject to (10) (11)
Next proposition characterizes it:
Proposition 2 (The second-best in the absence of fame) Suppose that (θi,γi) is agent
i￿s private information and α =0 . Under assumptions 2 and 3,




















where ￿∗∗(> 0) is the multiplier associated with the constraint (10) and is given by
￿








where B ≡ (ΠT − TT) − (ΠN − TN) − ∆pS(2qr − 1)b>0.




N) is such that











c. The total number of scientists is the same as in the ￿rst-best: νφ
∗





T +( 1− ν)φ
∗∗
N.
Proposition 2 establishes that there is a brain drain from the science sector to the
private sector in that the number of talented scientists is smaller in the second best than




T. It also establishes that a larger number of not-




N. Figure 1 describes the ￿rst-best
and the second-best allocations of talent in the absence of fame. As we have mentioned
above, the brain drain is generated by assumption 2, according to which the cap on
19Since in the ￿rst best the inequality b ≤ ﬂ b is violated, we will ￿nd b = ﬂ b in the second best; hence

















Set of implementable allocations 
under asymmetric information
Figure 1: The ￿rst-best and the second-best allocations of talent in the absence of fame
the bonus in the science sector b makes the monetary reward to talent in the science
sector smaller than the one in the private sector for any qr. This makes talented agents
have larger incentives to become professionals than not-talented agents such that the





T ). As b increases, there is less distortion in the allocation of talent from (12)
and (13) and social welfare increases. However, because of the speci￿c linear-quadratic





to the ￿rst-best level νφ
∗
T +( 1− ν)φ
∗
N.
3.2 Fame and allocation of talent
In this section agent i still has private information on θi and γi but derives utility from
fame (α > 0) and we study how fame aﬀects the allocation of talent. Now the incentive
constraints need to take into account the utility from recognition and in order to achieve
an interior allocation of talent (φT,φN) ∈ (0,1)
2, it is necessary that the following
incentive constraints are satis￿ed:
(ICT) ΠT − TT +2 γφT − γ + αp
R
Tη = βT(b + αη)+w; (14)
(ICN) ΠN − TN +2 γφN − γ + αp
R
Nη = βN(b + αη)+w. (15)
15The non-pecuniary reward to talent in the private sector is equal to αη∆pR, while the
non-pecuniary reward to talent in science is αη(βT − βN)=αη∆pS(2qr − 1).F r o m
assumption 1, when qr =1 , the latter is larger than the former. In contrast, when
qr = 1






such that the non-pecuniary reward to talent is larger in the science
sector than in the private sector if and only if the quality of the institution of science is
higher than qr.
For any given (φT,φN),w ec a n￿nd a pair (w,b) which satis￿es (14) and (15) if
qr > 1
2. However, this pair may violate b ≤ b and this constraint imposes a restriction
on the set of implementable allocations as follows:
φN ≥ φT +
(ΠT − TT) − (ΠN − TN) − ∆pS(2qr − 1)b + αη
£




which is an analog of the constraint (10). Our previous discussion implies that the
presence of fame (i.e. α > 0) relaxes (16) if and only if the quality of the institution
of science is higher than qr. In particular, if qr > qr and α is large such that the non-
pecuniary reward to talent in the science sector is much larger than the one in the private





When the ￿rst-best allocation cannot be achieved, we solve the following program:
max
(φT,φN)∈[0,1]





N(α)) denote the solution of the above program; it represents the optimal




N) violates (16). We have:
Proposition 3 (The eﬀects of fame) Suppose that (θi,γi) is agent i￿s private informa-
tion and α > 0. Under assumptions 1 to 3, there exists a threshold qr ∈ (1
2,1) such
that:
(i) The ￿rst-best allocation of talent can be achieved if the institution of science is good
enough (qr > qr) and the weight on fame α is large enough.




N(α)) is such that:




T (α)) and the total number of scientists is the
same as in the ￿rst-best: νφ
∗∗




T +( 1− ν)φ
∗
N.
b. (comparative statics on the brain drain)





16- As the weight on fame α increases, there is less (more) brain drain if the quality of
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A good institution of science improves the allocation of talent and mitigates the
brain drain by increasing both the monetary and non-monetary reward to talent in
the science sector: in particular, if the agents put suﬃcient weight α on fame, a good
institution of science can allow the government to achieve the ￿rst-best allocation. If the
￿rst-best cannot be achieved, there is a brain drain and how α aﬀects the brain drain
depends on the quality of the institution of science. In particular, if the quality of the
institution of science is bad such that the non-pecuniary reward to talent in terms of
fame is larger in the private sector than in the science sector, an increase in α makes
choosing professional even more attractive to talented agents and therefore aggravates
the brain drain. In other words, the existence of fame can reduce the brain drain only
if the quality of the institution is above a certain level. Last, as the pro￿tt a x e sb e c o m e
more progressive, the monetary reward to talent in the private sector is reduced and
therefore, ceteris paribus, the brain drain is mitigated.
Our results suggest that if, in the past, the western countries succeeded in inducing
talented people to become scientists without giving large monetary returns to talent,
it is mainly because they built a good institution of science to generate large non-
pecuniary returns to talent in the science sector. The results also suggest that highly
progressive income taxes in Europe have a secondary eﬀect of mitigating the brain drain
due to low-powered monetary incentives in academia while, in the U.S., relatively low
progressiveness of the income taxes requires relatively high-powered monetary incentives
in academia in order to mitigate the brain drain.
4 Extra monetary rewards through the market and
the allocation of talent
Salary and bonus are not the only sources of income for scientists since they can gen-
erate revenue from consulting fees, patents, prizes etc. Furthermore, speci￿cm e a s u r e s
such as the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) in the U.S. enable universities to claim ownership
of the intellectual property rights generated from federally funded research and provide
scientists in academia with incentives to commercialize innovations. In this section, we
17make an extension of the previous model to examine how the availability of extra mone-
tary rewards through the market (in particular, those from licensing patents) aﬀects the
brain drain. More precisely, we study the conditions under which it enlarges or reduces
the set of implementable allocations of talent.
One of the main concerns regarding the Bayh-Dole Act is that it can divert scientists￿
research from basic science to applied one (Cohen et als. 1998, Florida, 1999, National
Science Board, 2004, Thursby and Thursby 2003).20 We focus on this aspect and consider
a simple moral hazard problem; each scientist decides whether or not to divert some eﬀort
from basic to applied research. However, we depart from a simple linear relationship
between basic and applied science and introduce what we call the Pasteur￿s Quadrant
(PQ) coeﬃcient, denoted by yb
21, to capture the fact that basic research can to some
extent generate patentable scienti￿c knowledge. Therefore, even though a scientist does
n o td i v e r th e re ﬀort, she can make extra money from the licensing opportunity. More
precisely, if a type-θ scientist does not divert her eﬀort, her probability of making a
path-breaking discovery is pS
θ and generates a social bene￿to fpS
θyb (in expected terms)
from licensing in addition to sH(> 0). If there is diversion, her probability of making a
path-breaking discovery decreases by ∆θ (with pS
θ > ∆θ > 0 and pS
T − ∆T >p S
N − ∆N)
and the social bene￿t from licensing is equal to (pS
θ −∆θ)yb+∆θya with ya ≥ 0 where the
subscript a means applied science. Note that we assume that the market is eﬃcient in
that even though a path-breaking discovery is recognized as a low outcome, it generates
yb. This makes sense since even though an important discovery is not published in a top
journal, it can obtain a patent. We assume that a scientist captures a share δ ∈ (0,1]
of the social value generated from licensing and that the government cannot make a
scientist￿s salary depend on whether or not she diverts eﬀort as is the case in reality.
In this setting, given (w,b) chosen by the government, the payoﬀ of a type-θ scientist
is w+βθ(b+αη)+δpS
θyb if she fully dedicates herself to basic research and δ∆θya+w+
(βθ − (2qr − 1)∆θ)(b + αη)+δ(pS
θ − ∆θ)yb otherwise. Therefore, she does not engages
in applied research regardless of her type if and only if the PQ coeﬃcient is larger than
the threshold yb(b) given by:
yb(b) ≡
δya − (2qr − 1)(b + αη)
δ
. (18)
20However, the empirical evidence is mixed. For instances, Cohen et als (1998) provide evidence of
countervailing eﬀects of industry collaboration on faculty productivity in terms of publications while
Thursby and Thursby (2003) ￿nd that licensing did not aﬀect the portion of faculty￿s research that is
published in basic journals.
21The subscript b means basic science.
18When yb ≥ yb(b), basic research itself produces patentable knowledge and therefore
scientists do not need to engage in applied research.
In what follows, we suppose that both before and after making licensing opportunity
available, the ￿rst-best allocation of talent22 cannot be implemented because of the
constraint b ≤ b (and therefore it binds). Next proposition describes how the availability
of licensing opportunity aﬀects the set of implementable allocations of talent.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the government provides scientists with the opportunity to
patent and license their research.
(i) If the Pasteur￿s Quadrant (PQ) coeﬃcient yb is larger than the threshold yb,
providing the opportunity does not aﬀect scientists￿ research pattern and reduces the
brain drain where
yb ≡






(ii) If the Pasteur￿s Quadrant (PQ) coeﬃcient yb is smaller than the threshold yb,
providing the opportunity induces scientists to divert part of their attention from basic
to applied science. Furthermore;
(a) If talented scientists divert more than not-talented scientists (∆T ≥ ∆N), provid-
ing the opportunity reduces the brain drain.
(b) If talented scientists divert less than not-talented scientists (∆T < ∆N), there
is a threshold y
b(< yb) such that providing the opportunity reduces (worsens) the brain
drain if yb ≥ y
b (yb ≥ y




∆pS + ∆N − ∆T
.
The above proposition ￿rst reveals the importance of the Pasteur￿s Quadrant (PQ)
coeﬃcient in determining the impact of the licensing opportunity on the research pattern
a n dt h eb r a i nd r a i n .I ft h ec o e ﬃcient is high enough or if the quality of the institution is
good enough and the monetary and non-monetary incentives that it provides (b+αη)a r e
large enough, we expect that providing licensing opportunity has no impact on research
pattern since the opportunity cost of diverting attention to applied research increases
as qr (or b + αη) increases. In this case, the brain drain is reduced since a talented
scientist￿s expected income from licensing is higher than that of a not-talented one by
∆pSyb. Even though we do not model diﬀerent research ￿elds, in reality, the coeﬃcient
22It is diﬀerent from (6) and is de￿n e di nt h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 .
19should depend on the ￿eld: for instance, it should be high for life science and engineering
and low for physics and astronomy etc.
When the PQ coeﬃcient is lower than the threshold yb, scientists divert part of their
attention from basic to applied science. In this case, the eﬀect on the brain drain depends
both on the PQ coeﬃcient and on which type of scientists divert more. The change in
research pattern aﬀects the allocation of talent through three diﬀerent channels. First,
it reduces the licensing income originated from basic research by δ∆θyb for each type
of scientist. Second, it increases the licensing income originated from applied research
by δ∆θya for each type of scientist. When ∆T > ∆N (∆T < ∆N), the ￿rst two eﬀects
increase (reduce) the reward to talent by δ |∆T − ∆N|(ya−yb) since ya >y b when yb < yb
holds. Last, it aﬀects the information structure in science and changes the reward to
talent from the institution of science: for instance, if talented scientists divert more
than not-talented ones (∆T > ∆N), this makes the intrinsic outcome of science a noisier
signal of talent and thereby reduces the monetary and non-monetary return to talent
provided by the institution of science by (2qr − 1)(∆T −∆N)(b+αη).T h e￿rst two are
direct eﬀects and the last is an indirect eﬀect. The total eﬀect of the change in research
pattern on the reward to talent is given by
(∆T − ∆N)[δ(ya − yb) − (2qr − 1)(b + αη)].
Since the term in the bracket is positive when yb < yb, the change in research pattern
increases the reward to talent in science if and only if ∆T > ∆N. Since the availability
of licensing opportunity increases the reward to talent by ∆pSyb in the absence of the
change in research pattern, it reduces the brain drain whenever ∆T ≥ ∆N.I f∆T < ∆N
holds, we have to compare the positive eﬀect from the licensing opportunity with the
negative eﬀect from the change in research pattern. Since the positive eﬀect increases
with yb while the negative eﬀect decreases with yb, there is a threshold y
b such that the
availability of licensing opportunity worsens the brain drain if and only if yb ≤ y
b.
Therefore, we found that the availability of licensing opportunity worsens the brain
drain when the basic research does not generate much patentable scienti￿c knowledge and
the availability of licensing opportunity induces not-talented scientists to be specialized
in applied research. Even though this specialization makes the mapping from the talent
to the outcome a less noisy signal of talent in science and therefore has a potential to
reduce the brain drain, its is dominated by the direct eﬀect from the licensing revenue
which reduces the monetary return to talent in science.
Remark 1: optimality of providing extra monetary incentives through the
20market
We did not analyze whether providing licensing opportunity is optimal at the ￿rst
place from a social welfare point of view. If it does not aﬀect research pattern, obviously
it is optimal to provide licensing opportunity. If it does aﬀect research pattern, under
complete information (hence when there is no brain drain), it is socially optimal to





yb > ∆θ(sH − sL) for
θ = T or N. Our analysis suggests that even though this condition holds, the extra
incentives can reduce the social welfare under incomplete information if it causes a brain
drain.
5 Optimal allocation of public funds between re-
search grants and salaries
The analysis of the previous sections identi￿ed two kinds of rewards to scientists: mone-
tary and non-monetary rewards. The government usually has two instruments to control
them: salaries aﬀect the monetary rewards while research grants aﬀect the non-monetary
rewards when a scientist￿s probability to make a path-breaking discovery increases with
the amount of her research grant. In this section, we assume away any constraint on the
instruments (in particular, b ≤ ﬂ b and assumption 2) and derive the optimal wages and
grants and show the optimality of relatively ￿at wages in science. For this purpose, we
enrich the basic model in three respects.
First, after each agent makes her occupational choice, for each scientist i,t h eg o v -
ernment observes a signal σi which is positively correlated with θi but is not correlated
with θj for any j 6= i. The signal can be either good or bad: σi ∈ {G,B}. For instance,
σi represents scientist i￿s performance in the early stages of her career. Let qs ∈ [1
2,1]
represent the quality, or precision, of the signal in the following sense:
qs ≡ Pr{σi = G | θi = T} =P r {σi = B | θi = N}.
For simplicity, however, we assume that recognition depends only on the (￿nal) perceived
outcome and not on the early signal.
Second, the government allocates research grants to scientist i on the basis of σi;l e t
gG (gB) represent the research grant given to scientist i when σi = G (when σi = B). A
scientist￿s probability of making a path-breaking discovery depends both on her talent
and on her research grant. More precisely, let pS
θ(g) represent the probability for a type-θ
21scientist to make a path-breaking discovery when she receives grant g. Assumption 4
below speci￿es the properties of the functions pS
T(g) and pS
N(g).
Last, there is a positive shadow cost of public funds λ > 0.
We make the following assumption regarding pS
T(g) and pS
N(g):


























dg3 ≥ 0 for θ ∈ {T,N}.
The ￿rst part of the assumption says that the marginal productivity is positive and a




dg implies that the optimal g is strictly positive for both signals.
The second part says that the marginal productivity decreases and it does so faster for
a not-talented scientist than for a talented scientist. The last part says that marginal
productivity decreases in a decreasing way. For instance,
dpS
θ (g)
dg =m a x {cθ −dθg,0} with
cT >c N > 1+λ
sH−sL and dN >d T > 0 satis￿es assumption 4.
In this section we allow for α ≥ 0 but impose an upper bound on α:
Assumption 5: The social gain from a path-breaking discovery in the science sector
is larger than the private non-pecuniary gain in terms of fame: sH − sL > αη.
Even though fame induces a scientist to internalize the social bene￿tf r o map a t h -
breaking research, assumption 5 says that this internalization is partial even when qr =1 .
In what follows, we proceed in two steps. First, we ￿x an allocation of talent (φT,φN)
that the government wants to achieve and study the optimal allocation of public funds
between salaries and research grants. In particular, we examine how this allocation
of funds is aﬀected by a change in parameters α,q s,q r,λ. Second, we characterize the
optimal allocation of talent.
In this setting, we assume that the government can make the salary of a scientist
depend both on her signal and on her perceived outcome. However, because of risk
neutrality of the agents and the government, it turns out that there is no need to specify
the structure of the salaries and only the expected monetary rewards matter. Let me
T
(me
N)r e p r e s e n tt h ee x p e c t e dm o n e t a r yp a y o ﬀ to a talented scientist (a not-talented
scientist). As in the previous sections, βT (βN) is the probability for a talented scientist



































In order to implement a given allocation (φT,φN),i ti sn e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient that
(me
T,m e
N,g G,g B) satisfy the following incentive constraints




T + αηβT; (21)




N + αηβN. (22)
In order to ￿nd me
T and me
N which satisfy (21)-(22), it is necessary that there is some
non-zero correlation between the signals the government observes and the talent. Hence,
we consider qs > 1
2 and/or qr > 1
2.N o t e ￿rst that the left hand side of the incentive
constraint (ICθ) represents the reservation utility of a type-θ scientist having the intrinsic
preference γi =2 γφθ − γ. Given an allocation of talent, the reservation utility is ￿xed.
Therefore, an increase in gG or gB increases the non-pecuniary rewards to both types
of scientist through an increase in the probability of making a path-breaking discovery
and this in turn decreases their monetary rewards me
T and me
N through (21)-(22).
Since (φT,φN) is given, the contribution to social welfare generated by the private
sector is constant and the objective of the government is the social welfare generated by
the science sector minus the social cost of salaries and grants. We denote this objective
by SWS and let ST(g) ≡ pS
T(g)sH +( 1− pS
T(g))sL = sL +( sH − sL)pS
T(g), SN(g) ≡
sL +( sH − sL)pS
N(g). Then, we have:
SW
S = qs {νφT [ST(gG) − (1 + λ)gG]+( 1− ν)φN [SN(gB) − (1 + λ)gB]}
+(1 − qs){νφT [ST(gB) − (1 + λ)gB]+( 1− ν)φN [SN(gG) − (1 + λ)gG]}
−λ[νφTm
e





N as functions of (gG,g B) from (21) and (22) and inserting
them into SWS, we obtain a concave function of (gG,g B) which is maximized at the































23We cannot have gG =0and/or gB =0in the optimum because of assumption 4(i). Furthermore,
a (unique) solution to (23)-(24) exists because pS
T and pS








sH − sL + αλη(2qr − 1)










We give an economic interpretation of k through this special case. Consider a unitary
increase in gG for instance. On the one hand, the social marginal cost of providing a
unit of grant is 1+λ. On the other hand, there are two social marginal bene￿ts. One
is the direct bene￿t from an increased probability of having the path-breaking research,






. The other is the indirect bene￿tr e l a t e dt ot h e
reduction in the monetary reward necessary to maintain the given allocation of talent,
which is equal to
dpS
T(gG)





sH − sL + αλη(2qr − 1)
⁄
. Observe now that the numerator of k is the social
marginal cost of grants while the denominator represents the social marginal bene￿t
from an increase in pS
T. Therefore, we call kthe bene￿t-adjusted social marginal cost
of providing grants.L e t(g∗∗
G (α,q s,q r,λ),g∗∗
B (α,q s,q r,λ)) denote the optimal grants and
(me∗∗
T (α,q s,q r,λ),m e∗∗
N (α,q s,q r,λ)) the optimal expected salaries.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (optimal allocation of grants and salaries) Suppose that (θi,γi) is agent
i￿s private information. Under assumptions 4 and 5 and given an allocation of talent
(φT,φN)∈ (0,1)
2,




N ) are characterized by
(21)-(24) and are such that g∗∗
G >g ∗∗
B for any qs > 1
2.
(ii) As the quality of the signal qs increases, the grant to scientists with a good signal
g∗∗
G increases while the grant to scientists with a bad signal g∗∗
B decreases.
(iii) Given qs ∈ (1
2,1], as the weight on fame α increases, or the quality of the institution
of science qr increases, or the shadow cost of public funds λ decreases,
a. both grants g∗∗
G and g∗∗







The result of proposition 5(ii) is quite intuitive. In the extreme case of zero precision
of the signal (i.e. qs = 1
2), it is optimal to give the same level of grant regardless of the
24signal: g∗∗
G = g∗∗
B . As the precision increases from 1
2, it is optimal to increase the grant
to scientists with a good signal and to decrease the grant to those with a bad signal.
An increase in α reduces the bene￿t-adjusted social marginal cost k of providing
grants and therefore increasing the grants for both signals (thus reducing the mone-
tary rewards) is optimal. Furthermore, since the marginal productivity decreases in a
decreasing way and that of a talented scientist decreases less quickly than that of a
not-talented one, a reduction in k makes it optimal to increase g∗∗
G −g∗∗
B even though the
quality qs of the signal is ￿xed. Similarly, an increase in the quality of the institution of
science qr increases the non-pecuniary rewards produced by an incremental increase in
grants and therefore reduces k.





B . This result is not trivial and in order to provide an intuition, we ￿rst
consider the extreme case of λ =0 . Since in this case giving salaries is a pure transfer
and has no social cost, the optimal grants are determined by equalizing the direct social
bene￿t from increased scienti￿c production to the social cost of providing grants. This
can be seen from the fact that k is independent of α and qr when λ =0 .A sλincreases,
the social cost of grants 1+λ obviously increases but also the social bene￿ts of grants
sH−sL+αλη(2qr−1) increase because the indirect bene￿t from wage reductions increases
with λ. However, a scientist does not fully internalize the social bene￿tf r o map a t h -
breaking research from assumption 5 and therefore we have sH −sL > αη(2qr −1).T h i s
implies that the increase in the total bene￿ts is relatively smaller than the increase in
the cost and therefore k increases as λ increases. Therefore, as λ increases, it is optimal
to decrease grants while increasing salaries.
Now we compare the monetary reward to talent in the science sector with the one







sH−sL. Then, we have g∗∗
G (α,q s,q r,λ) ≥ g∗∗
B (α,q s,q r,λ) ≥ g












This assumption is a suﬃcient condition to make the intrinsic outcome a less noisy
signal of talent in science than in the private sector when grants are chosen optimally, for
any (α,q s,λ) (see the proof of proposition 6(ii)). From (21)-(22), the diﬀerence between
the monetary reward to talent in the private sector (ΠT − TT − ΠN + TN)a n dt h eo n e
in the science sector (me∗∗
T − me∗∗
N )i sg i v e nb y :
αη
'
(βT − βN) − ∆p
R“
− 2γ (φT − φN). (25)
25Therefore, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose that (θi,γi) is agent i￿s private information. Under assump-
tions 4 and 5, given an allocation of talent (φT,φN)∈ (0,1)
2;
(i) As the quality of the institution of science qr increases or as the shadow cost of
public funds λ decreases, the monetary reward to talent in the science sector decreases
with respect to the one in the private sector;






B),t h em o n e t a r y
reward to talent in the science sector is lower than the one in the private sector if











Proposition 6 is closely related to the results of Proposition 5. An increase in qr or a
decrease in λ increases g∗∗
G − g∗∗
B , which increases the non-monetary reward to talent in
the science sector. This in turn implies, given an allocation of talent, a decrease in the
monetary reward to talent in the science sector relative to the one in the private sector.
Proposition 6 (ii) says that when the quality of the institution of science is good enough,
it is optimal to have the monetary reward to talent in the science sector lower than the
one in the private sector for all allocations satisfying φT ≤ φN +Φ(qr) where Φ(qr) > 0.
Note that Φ(qr) increases with qr and α. Therefore even though an optimal allocation
of talent requires φT > φN, if the institution of science is good enough and the weight
on fame is large enough, achieving the optimal allocation requires the monetary reward
to talent in the science sector to be lower than the one in the private sector. This is
because the science sector can provide a high non-monetary reward to talent given that
the intrinsic outcome is a less noisy signal of talent in science than in the private sector.
Therefore proposition 6(ii) provides a justi￿cation for the optimality of relatively ￿at
wages in science.
We now study the optimal allocation of talent given that salaries and grants are
chosen optimally. The social welfare is given by:







Using the envelope theorem, we ￿nd the ￿rst order condition with respect to (φT,φN)
(for an interior maximum) as follows:
ΠT+γ (2φT − 1) = qs [ST(g
∗∗










26ΠN+γ (2φN − 1) = qs [SN(g
∗∗










The left hand side represents the social gain that the marginal agent who is indiﬀerent
between the two professions produces as a professional while the right hand side repre-
sents the social gain that she produces as a scientist. The right hand side is composed
of the social gain from research minus the social cost of grants and wages: the last term
me∗∗
θ +2 γφθ is equal to
∂(φθme∗∗
θ )
∂φθ (i.e. the increase in the wage bill φθme∗∗
θ induced by a
marginal increase in φθ).
6 Discussions
Our results suggest that the current increase in team size in science24 might have a
negative consequence in terms of the brain drain as scienti￿c production becomes team
work similar to production in ￿rms. For instance, it is possible on an experimental
article in physics for the author list to be longer than the article and in such a case the
role of the individual scientist is almost impossible to evaluate. In fact, Merton (1968)
argues that the growth of team work makes the recognition of individual contributions
by others problematic. In our model, increase in team size might make the outcome in
science a noisier signal of talent.
It would be interesting to study how recognition from non-peers aﬀects the allocation
of talent. In general, outsiders would have diﬃc u l t yt ot e l lw h e t h e rap r o f e s s o rh a sg o o d
or bad publication records but it would not be diﬃcult for them to know about the
institution to which a professor belongs. Since non-peers would give more recognition
to professors of prestigious universities than to professors of mediocre universities and
becoming professor of prestigious universities would generally require talent, a hierarchi-
cal organization of universities as in U.S. could increase the reward to talent in terms of
non-peer recognition and hence mitigate the brain drain. In contrast, in (Continental)
Europe, most universities are local monopoly and therefore there is not much quality
diﬀerentiation among them.
Although we focused on the moral hazard in terms of occupational choice in this
paper, we can apply the framework of section 5 to study the optimal balance between
24Adams et als. (2004) ￿nd that team size increases by 50 percent over the period of 1981-1999 in
U.S.
27the monetary and the non-monetary incentives in the context of designing the optimal
incentive schemes to boost research eﬀort in science. Our framework can be also used to
study how the balance should depend on the information (signal) available about each
researcher￿s ability from their past research records.
Finally, if most agents highly value autonomy or freedom in academia, this would
make wage in academia lower than the one in the private sector as in Aghion, Dewa-
tripont and Stein (2005). Although this can be easily captured in our model with a
negative mean value of γi, our focus is not about the absolute wage diﬀerential in both
sectors but about the relatively ￿at monetary reward to talent in science. If a talented
agent appreciates more autonomy than a not-talented one since the former derives more
pleasure from puzzle solving than the latter, one can have a relatively ￿at earning struc-
ture in science without brain drain. Although this positive correlation between pleasure
from puzzle solving and talent is likely to hold, an explanation entirely based on the
positive correlation cannot shed any light on the role of the institution of science as a
mechanism distributing priority recognition emphasized by Merton.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The earning structure in science is known to be ￿at relative to the one in the private
sector and this raises the concern about the brain drain from the science sector to the
private sector. This paper points out that since the performance is less noisy signal
of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, if agents care about both
money and peer recognition, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain
by providing a high non-pecuniary reward to talent. Furthermore, when institution
of science is good and scientists care a lot about priority recognition, a relative ￿at
earning structure in science is likely to be optimal. Despite the desirability of providing
strong monetary and non-monetary incentives to scientists by making their salaries and
research grants depend on publications, one should be cautious with introducing extra
monetary incentives through the market by encouraging research for commercialization.
For instance, the extra incentives can induce a shift from basic to applied research,
which might make the performance in science a more noisier signal of talent and thereby
undermine the incentives from the institution of science.
Our study oﬀers a useful insight about the primary role of the institution of science
in providing monetary and non-monetary rewards to scientists. In this respect, Internet
technology creates a unique opportunity to improve the institution of science by making
28it possible to speed up the refereeing process and to make wide distribution of journals at
low (close to zero) marginal cost. However, there exist concerns that the private interests
of the commercial publishers having market power might con￿ict with the realization of
the potential gain from the technology.25
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Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) The ￿rst order conditions (4)-(5) are suﬃcient for the optimality of an interior allo-
cation since SW is strictly concave in (φT,φN). Hence, (6) is optimal if it is interior,
which turns out to be the case if and only if γ >S θ − Πθ > −γ for θ ∈ {N,T}.
(ii) The proof is straightforward.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Let B =( ΠT −TT)−(ΠN−TN)−∆pS(2qr−1)b for brevity and de￿ne the Lagrangian
by L ≡ SW + ￿(10) where ￿ is the multiplier associated with the (10). Then, the ￿rst-
order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂φT
= ν(−ΠT + ST + γ(1 − 2φT)) − ￿ =0 (28)
∂L
∂φN
=( 1 − ν)(−ΠN + SN + γ(1 − 2φN)) + ￿ =0 . (29)





















N) if ￿ =0 , thus violating (10);




N). Plugging these values into (10) yields





N) > 0; hence, (12) is interior if and only if 2γ − νB>
ν(γ − ΠT + ST)+( 1− ν)(γ − ΠN + SN) > (1 − ν)B.S i n c e ￿∗∗ > 0, we obtain (iia).
Result (iib) holds because B>0 by assumption 2. From (12) it is straightforward to
verify that (iic) holds.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3





if α is large.
(iia) The proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 2, except that now B is replaced
by B0 ≡ B + αη
£
∆pR − ∆pS(2qr − 1)
⁄
. In particular, the condition for an interior
allocation is now 2γ − νB0 > ν(γ − ΠT + ST)+( 1− ν)(γ − ΠN + SN) > (1 − ν)B0.
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to φθ are still (28) and (29) except for the fact
that α > 0 aﬀects the multiplier associated with the constraint (16), which is now



















(iib) When qr increases, B0 decreases and therefore φ
∗∗
T (α) increases. When α increases,
B0 increases or decreases depending on whether ∆pR > ∆pS(2qr−1) or ∆pR < ∆pS(2qr−
1), which is equivalent to saying qr < ﬂ qr or qr > ﬂ qr.W h e nτ increases, B0 decreases.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4





￿rst-best allocation conditional on that yb < yb (i.e. type-θ scientist diverts eﬀort from

























We can represent the incentive constraints which (w,b) needs to satisfy (in addition
to b ≤ ﬂ b) in order to implement a given interior allocation (φT,φN) as follows:
ΠT − TT +2 γφT − γ + αp
R







ΠN − TN +2 γφN − γ + αp
R







After solving (31)-(32) with respect to (w,b),w e￿nd that b ≤ ﬂ b reduces to
ΠT − TT − (ΠN − TN)+2 γ(φT − φN)+α∆pRη ≤
δ
£
(∆T − ∆N)(ya − yb)+∆pSyb
⁄
+( 2 qr − 1)(∆pS − ∆T + ∆N)(b + αη)
(33)




N ). Therefore, (33)
is binding in the solution to the second-best problem and b = ﬂ b. Providing licensing





(2qr − 1)(b + αη) − δya
⁄
δ [∆pS − ∆T + ∆N]
. (34)
Note ￿rst that ∆pS −∆T +∆N = pS
T −∆T −(pS
N +∆N) > 0. yb > 0 holds if and only if
b + αη ≤ δya holds or b + αη > δya and qr <q ∗∗
r where q∗∗
r is given by
(2q
∗∗
r − 1)(b + αη)=δya.
We only need to consider yb > 0; otherwise, providing licensing opportunity does not
aﬀect research pattern. Consider ￿rst ∆T ≥ ∆N.I fb+αη ≤ δya or if b +αη > δya and
qr <q ∗∗
r ,w eh a v ey
b ≤ 0 ≤ yb.S i n c eyb > 0, in this case, providing licensing opportunity
relaxes (16) and therefore reduces the brain drain. Consider now ∆T < ∆N. Then,
whenever yb > 0, yb >y
b > 0. Therefore, providing licensing opportunity reduces the
brain drain if and only if yb ≥ yb >y
b.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
(i) If g∗∗
G ≤ g∗∗

























dgB − k is multiplied









dgB − k is multiplied by (1 − ν)φNqs (> (1 − ν)φN(1 − qs)) in (24). We
infer therefore that the left hand side of (23) is positive if (24) is satis￿ed, which is a
contradiction.

































































dqs are positive. The numerator of
dg∗∗
G




















dgB −k by assumption
4(i) and (24).
34(iiia) We prove that
∂g∗∗
θ









∂α < 0;h e n c e ,i t
suﬃces that we prove
∂g∗∗
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∂k < 0 by assumption 4(ii). The proof that
∂g∗∗
θ





In order to prove that
∂g∗∗
θ












0 by assumption 5.
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,w h i c hr e d u c e s
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B . Hence, since νφTqs(νφT(1 − qs)+( 1− ν)φNqs) − νφT(1 − qs)(νφTqs +( 1−
ν)φN(1−qs)) = νφTφN (2qs − 1)(1 − ν) and (1−ν)φN(1−qs)(νφT(1−qs)+(1−ν)φNqs)−
(1−ν)φNqs(νφTqs +(1−ν)φN(1−qs)) = −νφTφN (2qs − 1)(1 − ν),i ti ss u ﬃcient that
we prove the inequality























G by assumption 4(ii).
















dgG and assumption 4.
35P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
(i) We have
































∂gB > 0.W e
have:
∂ (βT − βN)
∂gG
+






































∂gB)f r o m( 2 3 )
and (24), so that
∂pS
T
















expression into (37) we obtain:
•
∂ (βT − βN)
∂gG
+






























∂gB > 0 if the following inequality holds:
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G )+( 1− qs)pS
T(g∗∗
B ) − qspS
N(g∗∗




where the last term is pos-





















































Therefore, a decrease in λ reduces the monetary reward to talent in the science sector.
36(ii) We have









































































Therefore, when qr =1 , from Assumption 1￿, (βT − βN) > ∆pR.W h e n qr = 1
2, βT −
βN =0< ∆pR. Therefore, the result is obtained from (25).
37